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Recent research has questioned the usefulness of Vector Autoregression (VAR)
models as a description of monetary policy, especially in light of the low correlation
between forecast errors from VARs and those derived from Fed funds futures rates.
This paper presents three ﬁndings on VARs’ ability to describe monetary policy. First,
the correlation between forecast errors is a misleading measure of how closely the
VAR forecast mimics the futures market’s. In particular, the low correlation is partly
due to a weak positive correlation between the VAR forecasts and the futures market
errors. Second, Fed funds rate forecasts from common VAR speciﬁcations do tend to
be noisy, but this can be remedied by estimating more parsimonious models on post-
1982 data. Third, time aggregation problems caused by the structure of the Fed funds
futures market can distort the timing and magnitude of shocks derived from futures
rates, and complicate comparisons with VAR-based forecasts. JEL classiﬁcation: C52,
E52.
1 Introduction
How does monetary policy affect the economy? To answer that question requires solving
a basic simultaneity problem: monetary policy affects the economy while at the same time
responding endogenously to changing macroeconomic conditions. Empirically estimating
the effects of policy therefore requires some observable exogenous element to policy. The
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1narrativeapproach pioneered by Friedman and Schwartz (1963), and applied by Romer and
Romer (1989), is one way to identify exogenous policy shifts. A more common approach,
however, is the Vector Autoregression technique developed by Sims (1972), (1980a) and
(1980b). In this procedure, changes in the monetary policy instrument that are not ex-
plained by the variables included in the model are interpreted as exogenous changes in
policy, or policy “shocks”. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997) provides a survey of
this line of research.
One unresolved question is how well simple econometric procedures, like VARs, can
describe the monetary authority’s response to economic conditions, and by extension, the
policy shocks used to identify policy’s effects on the economy. There are several reasons
to be skeptical of the VAR approach. VAR models (indeed, all econometric models) typi-
cally include a relatively small number of variables, while the Fed is presumed to “look at
everything” in formulating monetary policy. By assuming linearity, VARs rule out plausi-
ble asymmetries in the response of policy, such as those resulting from an “opportunistic”
disinﬂation policy. VARs’ coefﬁcients are assumed to remain constant over time, despite
well-documented changes in the Fed’s objectives and operating procedures.
The goal of this paper is to assess VARs’ accuracy in predicting changes in mone-
tary policy, and the shock measures derived from those predictions, using forecasts from
the Federal funds futures market as a basis for comparison. Section 2 reviews the VAR
methodology, and its putative deﬁciencies. Section 3 shows that the correlation between
the VAR and the futures market forecast errors can give a misleading picture of the VAR’s
accuracy, and suggestslookinginsteadat therelationshipbetween theforecasts themselves.
The results in section 4 show that proﬂigacy per se doesn’t hurt the VAR’s performance,
but reducing the number of lags and estimating the model over a more recent subsample
can improve the model’s forecast accuracy. Section 5 discusses the time aggregation prob-
lems inherent in extracting policy surprises from Fed funds futures data. The conclusions,
summarized in section 6, are that VARs mimic the futures market’s forecasts reasonably
well, but that it would be misleading to use futures market forecasts as the only basis for
comparison.
22 VARs: the technique and its critiques
The reduced form of a VAR simply involves the regression of some vector of variables, x,
















=W. In monetary applications, the xt vector would include one (or more) indi-
cators of monetary policy, along with the other macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables.
The widely-used model of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (CEE) (1996a), includes
the Federal funds rate, rt, logarithms of lagged payroll employment (N), the personal con-
sumption deﬂator (P), nonborrowed reserves (NBR), total reserves (TR), and M1, and the
smoothed growth rate of sensitive materials prices (PCOM).1 The funds rate equation from





























































a regression of the Fed funds rate on lagged values of all the variables included in the VAR.









the shocks and feedbacks are given economic interpretations. The covariance matrix of
the e innovations is diagonal, and contemporaneous feedback between elements of x is
captured by the B0 matrix. The equation involving the monetary policy instrument (the
Fed funds rate, for example) is often interpreted as a reaction function describing the Fed’s
response to economic conditions. By extension, the innovation to this equation is taken
to represent “shocks” to monetary policy. A great deal of research and debate has cen-
tered on the identifying assumptions embodied in the choice of B0. Examples include
Bernanke (1986), Sims (1992), Strongin (1995), Bernanke and Mihov (1995), Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (1996b), and Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996). The typical focus of
1This series was a component in the BEA’s index of leading economic indicators prior to its recent revi-
sion by the Conference Board. Recent observations of the series used here are computed using the BEA’s
methodology from raw commodity price data from the Conference Board.
3this research is the impulse response functions of macroeconomic variables in response to
monetary policy shocks, and how the speciﬁc identifying assumptions affect the responses.
This paper does not deal with the identiﬁcation issue, but focuses instead on a more
basic question: whether the reduced form of the VAR, and the monetary policy equation
in particular, generate sensible forecasts. Rudebusch (1998) pointed out that the Fed funds
futures market provides a ready benchmark for evaluating the VAR’s Fed funds rate equa-
tion.2 This strategy makes sense if the futures market is efﬁcient, in the sense that its errors




￿1, would therefore represent the rational expectation of the period t Fed funds rate
conditional on information at time t









where rt is the average overnight Fed funds rate in month t, consistent with the structure
of the futures contract. To avoid familiar time averaging problems, the futures rate is taken
from the last business day of the month.4
A glance at the series plotted in ﬁgure 1 shows that the VAR’s forecast errors bear
little resemblance to the futures market surprises. The correlation between the two is
only 0.35 for one-month-ahead forecasts, comparable to the R2 of 0.10 reported in Rude-
busch (1998).5 The correlations between two- and three-month ahead shocks are somewhat
higher.6 If the futures market surprises are interpreted as the “true” shocks, this immedi-
ately calls the VAR approach into question.
A related problem is the VAR’s poor forecasting performance, both in and out of sam-
ple. As shown in table 1, the standard deviation of the regression’s residuals is much higher
2Fed funds futures are known ofﬁcially as Thirty-Day Interest Rate futures.
3TheﬁndingsofKruegerandKuttner(1996)generallysupportthisview. Resultslesssupportiveofmarket
efﬁciency were reported by Sims (1998). In a regression of the average Fed funds rate on lagged monthly
averages of T-bill and discount rates, and Fed funds futures rate from the middle of the previous month, the
T-bill and discountrates were statistically signiﬁcant. When comparablepoint-sampledinterest rates are used
as regressors, however, market efﬁciency (i.e., the joint hypothesis that the coefﬁcient on the lagged futures
rate is 1 and the coefﬁcients on other interest rates are zero) cannot be rejected.
4The futuresrate appearsto containa forwardpremiumof approximately5 basis pointsfor the one-month
contract, which is subtracted from the futures rate in calculating the forecast error.
5The variance and covariance estimates used to compute correlation coefﬁcients are adjusted for the de-
grees of freedom used in estimation. Because computing the variance of the Fed funds futures shock doesn’t







),w h e r eT is the number of observations, and k is the number of VAR coefﬁcients.
6Two- and three- month ahead forecasts are obtained by regressing rt on lags 2–12 and 3–12 of the same
set of right-hand-side variables. The advantage of this shortcut is that it doesn’t require estimating the entire
VAR.
4Figure 1: Fed funds futures surprises and CEE forecast errors
one month ahead
























5Table 1: The case against VARs
Standard deviation Avg SE
Horizon, CEE model of CEE CEE-futures






















Notes: The CEE modelis estimatedon monthlydatafrom January 1961 through July 1997.
The reported statistics are based on the May 1989 through December 1997 sample. The
in-sample standard deviation and correlations are adjusted for the degrees of freedom used
in estimation. Units are basis points.
than the futures market’s forecast errors. The out-of-sample RMSE is higher still, well in
excess of the RMSE of a naive “no change” forecast.
A third, less widely recognized, problem is the large standard error associated with the





































where X is the T
￿k matrix of variables appearing on the right-hand side of the Federal
funds rate equation, and s2 is the variance of u.7 The average standard error of the shocks,
reported in the ﬁfth column of table 1, and 95% conﬁdence bounds around the CEE shocks
are plotted in ﬁgure 2. The estimates’ imprecision is immediately visible in the ﬁgure; zero
is well within the conﬁdence bounds for most of the shocks, as are most of the futures
market surprises.8
What accounts for this these deﬁciencies? Several authors, notably Rudebusch (1998),
Pagan and Robertson (1995), and McNees (1992), have emphasized parameter instability
as a possible explanation. Rudebusch cites the VARs’ proﬂigate speciﬁcation as another
7Since the regressors are not exogenous, this represents the variance of the posterior distribution condi-
tional on realized X, given a ﬂat prior.
8The share of futures market surprises falling outside the bounds is 0.17, which represents a statistically
signiﬁcant deviation from the expected 0.05.
6Figure 2: One-month Fed funds futures surprises and 95% CEE conﬁdence bands










candidate. Nonlinearities in the Fed’s reaction function, such as those arising from “oppor-
tunistic” disinﬂation ` a la Orphanides and Wilcox (1996) are another possibility, and Mc-
Carthy (1995) provides some evidence supporting this view. In addition, the VAR leaves
out variables that might help forecast monetary policy. Alternatively, the estimated equa-
tion may include variables not available to investors in real time.
One response to these criticisms is the conjecture that they don’t matter for impulse re-
sponse functions and variance decompositions, which are the focus of most VAR analyses.
After all, VARs deliverrobust, relatively precise estimates of the impact of monetary policy
shocks while explicitly accounting for the shock estimates’ uncertainty in the computation
of the impulse response functions’ error bands. Unfortunately, Fed funds futures rate data
don’tgo back far enoughtomakereliablecomparisonsbetween impulseresponsefunctions
based on VARs with those derived from futures market shocks. Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (1997) report responses based on futures rate shocks, but with less than nine
years’ of futures rate data, the standard errors are very large. Related work by Brunner
(1997), however, found that shocks incorporating ﬁnancial market and survey expectations
generate impulse response functions similar to those from VARs, despite a low correlation
between the measures.
Our view is that the problems are less severe than they appear, and that standard speciﬁ-
cations can provide a better description of monetary policy than Rudebusch’s results would
suggest. First, the correlation between VAR and futures-market shocks is a poor gauge of
the VAR’s performance. Quantitatively small deviations from perfect futures market efﬁ-
7Table 2: Alternative measures of ﬁt
Shock Dr forecasts







ciency create a signiﬁcant downward bias in the correlation. Second, small modiﬁcations
to standard VAR speciﬁcations, such as reducing lag lengths and estimating over shorter
samples, can tangibly improvethe ﬁt and precision of the models’ forecasts. Finally, a time
aggregation problem inherent in the futures rate can distort the timing and magnitude of
shocks derived from the futures market.
3 How sensible is the correlation metric?
In usingtheFed funds futures rateto evaluatetheVAR’s performance, onenatural compari-
son is between the forecasts themselves: in this case, between the lagged one-month-ahead
futures rate f1
;t
￿1 and the VAR’s forecast ˆ r
VAR
t . Perhaps because of the recent emphasis
on policy shocks, however, assessments of VARs’ performance have often involved the
forecast errors rather than the forecasts themselves; see, for example, Rudebusch (1998),
Brunner (1997) and Christiano et al. (1997).
At ﬁrst glance, the correlation between shocks would seem to be a sensible basis for
comparison; if the two procedures yielded the same forecasts, the shocks would be iden-
tical, and the correlation would be 1.0. Closer scrutiny shows that this measure can give
a misleading picture, however; the covariance between the shocks has little to do with the
covariance between the forecasts. The correlation between shocks can therefore make bad
forecasting models look good, and good models look bad.
A comparison between the VAR and a naive “no change” forecast forcefully illustrates
this point. Because the Fed funds rate is well described as an I(1) process, forecasts of
the rates themselves will tend to be very highly correlated; the correlation between the








￿1, will therefore be more
informative. As reported in the ﬁrst line of table 2, the correlation between the forecast
changeintheFed fundsrateis 0.43, andtheshockcorrelationis 0.35. Samplinguncertainty
associated with the estimated VAR coefﬁcients (readily apparent as “noise” in the forecast
8Figure 3: Forecast one-month change in the Fed funds rate










plotted in ﬁgure 3) will increase the variance of the VAR forecasts, however, which will
reduce the correlation between forecasts. One way to eliminate the effect of parameter




￿1 in the denominator of the correlation




￿1. The result is just the ˆ b from the regression of
















Making this adjustment for parameter uncertainty yields a ˆ b of 0.57, further improving the
CEE model’s measured ﬁt with respect to the futures market benchmark.







compare? The implied change from this forecast is, of course, zero. Consequently, the
“no change” model’s forecast of the change in the Fed funds rate is uncorrelated with
everything, including the forecasts from the Fed funds futures rate and the funds rate itself
(hence the zeros in the second line of table 2). On this criterion, obviously, the VAR
provides the better description of monetary policy. By contrast, the correlation between the
“no change” forecast errors, rt
￿rt
￿1, and the futures market surprises, rt
￿ f1
;t
￿1,i s0 . 5 2
— much higher than the CEE model’s. Judged on this criterion, therefore, the “no change”
forecast describes monetary policy than the VAR.
9How can the “no change” forecast errors be more highly correlated with the Fed funds
futures surprises than the VAR’s, when the VAR’s forecasts are closer to the futures mar-
ket’s? The answer, it turns out, is that the correlation between shocks says very little about
how well the VAR describes monetary policy, and a lot more about small deviations from
efﬁciency in the Fed funds futures market.
3.1 Anatomy of a correlation
The correlation between Fed funds futures surprises, u
￿
t , and forecast errors from an econo-























Since the variance of the Fed funds futures surprise is the same for each ˆ u we consider,
differences in the correlation between shocks must be attributable either to differences in
the covariance between the shocks, or to the variance of the estimated errors. Substituting
rt













































￿1. Writing the covariance term in this way reveals two important fea-
tures.






), mechanically builds in a positive correlation between the
two shocks. Just as important, this contribution to the covariance is wholly independent of
the model’s forecasts. In fact, it will be positive even if the model is of no use whatsoever
in forecasting the Fed funds rate, as in the case of the “no change” model discussed above.
The second key observation is that a positive covariance between the model’s forecast,
c Drt, and the futures market surprise, u
￿
t will reduce the covariance between the shocks.
Market efﬁciency implies a zero covariance between u
￿
t and elements of the t
￿1 infor-
mation set. In practice, however, it is highly unlikely that the sample covariance will be
zero even if the market is efﬁcient. Indeed, Krueger and Kuttner (1996) found that this
covariance, while nonzero, was generally statistically insigniﬁcant.

















































), is 13.1, and the






), is 127.1. Units are basis points. Statistics are not adjusted for degrees of
freedom.
Taken together, these two observations explain the “no change” forecast’s surprisingly
high correlation with the futures market surprises. As reported in table 3, the covariance
between Drt and u
￿
t is 127.1, while the covariance between
c Drt and u
￿
t is identically zero.
Dividing by the relevant standard deviations yields the correlation of 0.52 — well in excess
of the CEE model’s, despite the zero correlation between the forecasts themselves.
An analogous breakdown for the CEE model reported on the second line of table 3
shows that a positivecovariance between the VAR’s predictions and the futures market sur-
prises partially accounts for the model’s small shock correlation. The relevant covariance
is 39.5; subtracting this number from 127.1 and dividing by the relevant standard devia-
tions yields the correlation of 0.32 (without a degrees-of-freedom adjustment). Had the
Fed funds futures surprises been orthogonal to the VAR forecast, the correlation would
have been 0.46.
One interpretation of this result is that the futures market is not efﬁcient. The violation
implied by this result is not quantitatively or statistically signiﬁcant, however. The regres-
sion of the futures market surprise onto the VAR forecast has an R2 of only 0.019, and the
t-statistic on the CEE forecast’s coefﬁcient is only 1.41. But because standard deviations
of the shocks, rather than the interest rate (or its change) appears in the denominator, a very
small covariance can have a pronounced effect on the shock correlation.
The forecasts from a simple model involving the T-bill rate provide another illustration
of the perverse properties of the shock correlation. A regression of the average Fed funds














was used to generate (in-sample) one-month-ahead predictions. Since the T-bill rate pre-
sumably incorporates expectations of subsequent months’ Fed funds rate, it comes as no
surprise that this equation’s forecasts are highly similar to those from the Fed funds futures
market; in fact, the regression of the former on the latter gives a coefﬁcient of 0.99. Yet the
correlation between the shocks is 0.62 — only 20% higher than the “no change” forecast’s.
Again, the nonzero covariance between the model’s forecasts and the futures market shock
violates the assumption of strict orthogonality, but since this covariance is negative, it in-
creases the shock correlation.10 But the forecast’s volatility is somewhat higher than the
futures market’s, and this reduces the correlation.
3.2 Does the VAR use too much information?
Aside from a violation of strict market efﬁciency, one reason for the CEE forecast’s co-
variance with futures rate surprises is that the VAR incorporates “too much” information.
The VAR forecast of the November funds rate (say) uses October’s data, even though the
most recent data on employment and prices is from September.11 Moreover, much of these
data are subsequently revised, and as Orphanides (1997) showed, the revisions can have
a major impact on the ﬁt of simple monetary policy rules. Consequently, the correlation
between the futures market surprises and the VARforecasts may be an artifact of the VAR’s
information advantage.
To see what impact this might have on the correlations, we re-ran the CEE equation
with additional lags on payroll employmentand consumer prices. (The reserves and money
statistics are essentially known by the end of the month.) The results of this exerciseappear
in theﬁnal row oftable3, labeled “modiﬁed CEE.” Thischange reduces thepositivecovari-
ance between the VAR forecasts and the futures market surprises somewhat, as would be
expected if it were the result of the VAR’s information advantage. Substituting unrevised,
real-time data in place of the revised data used here might further reduce the covariance.
9The regression uses last-day-of-the-month T-bill rate data, and it is estimated over the January 1961
through December 1997 sample.
10The lagged futures rate is itself weakly (negatively) correlated with the futures market surprise.
11Forthisreason,KruegerandKuttner(1996)werecarefultointroduceadditionallagswhentestingfutures
market efﬁciency.
124 Parsimony and parameter instability
As shown above, the positive covariance between futures market surprises and VAR fore-
casts partially accounts for the low correlation between the VAR forecast errors and the
futures market surprises. The dissection of the correlation coefﬁcient also revealed a sec-
ond culprit: thevariance ofthe shocksfrom theVAR is considerably higherthan thefutures
market surprises. Since the square root of this variance appears in the denominator, it, too,
will reduce the measured correlation.
What accounts for the VAR’s inﬂated shock variance? One possibility is the VAR’s
generous parameterization — 85 parameters in the monthly CEE speciﬁcation. The proﬂi-
gacy of the CEE model surely explains the imprecision of the shock estimates, but it alone
cannot explain the shocks’ implausibly high variance, so long as the “true” model is nested
within it.
Estimatingthe VAR over the 1961–97sample might, however, contributeto the shocks’
volatility if the parameters changed over time. A model estimated over a sample that in-
cluded the 1979–82 M1 targeting regime, for example, will almost surely be inappropriate
for later periods when the Fed’s weight on monetary aggregates is smaller — if not zero.
The spurious inclusion of M1 could therefore introduce noise into the forecasts for later pe-
riods. Other research has turned up signiﬁcant time variation along these lines. Friedman
and Kuttner (1996) estimated a time-varying-parameter version of a funds rate equation,
and found signiﬁcant variation in the coefﬁcient on the monetary aggregates correspond-
ing to the shifts in targeting regimes. Instability has also been documented by Pagan and
Robertson (1995).
Table 4 reports the results of shortening the lag lengths and estimating the CEE model
over shorter sample periods.12 Comparing the twelve-lag to the six-lag results for the full
sample shows that greater parsimony increases the shock correlation slightly, presumably
by reducing the covariance between futures market surprises and the VAR forecasts. (Ob-
viously, eliminating all right-hand-side variables drive this covariance to zero.) But greater
parsimony actually reduces the correlation between the forecasts, and the forecast RMSE
falls only slightly. The reduction in the number of coefﬁcients to be estimated shrinks the
standard error drastically, however.
The results improveconsiderably when the estimationperiod is restricted to theJanuary
12As in table 1, the correlations and standard deviations are adjusted for the degrees of freedom used in
estimation.
13Table 4: Improving the VAR forecasts
Avg. std.
Std. dev. Forecast error of Forecast Shock



































































Notes: The reported statistics are based on the May 1989 through December 1997 sample.
The in-sample standard deviation and correlations are adjusted for the degrees of freedom
used in estimation. Units are basis points.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































151983 through July 1997 sample. For one thing, the forecasts are now much less noisy.
At 16.2 basis points, the standard deviation of the estimated one-month-ahead shocks is
now only slightly larger than the futures market’s.13 The correlation between the shock
measures rises to 0.54, but again the positive covariance between the model’s forecast and
the futures market surprises again prevents it from rising even higher. The regression of the
model’s forecast on the futures market’s yields a coefﬁcient of 0.52. The VAR does even
better at longer horizons. At three months, the estimated ˆ b for the forecasts is 0.75, and
forecast errors’ correlation is 0.60. The forecasts and shocks plotted in ﬁgure 4 conﬁrm
that the VAR approximately mimics the systematic and unsystematic changes in the funds
rate implied by Fed funds futures rates.
5 Time aggregation
The timing of the surprises extracted from monthly or quarterly VARs is, of course, some-
what ambiguous. At ﬁrst glance, it would seem that shocks derived from the Fed funds fu-
tures rate would be free of such ambiguity. That turns out not to be true, however. The Fed
funds futures contract’s settlement price is based on the monthly average of the overnight
Fed funds rate, which creates a time aggregation problem. Consequently, the timing and
magnitude of policy shocks based on the futures rate are also ambiguous.
To illustrate this problem, consider the following scenario. The Fed funds rate is 5% in
March, and this rate is expected to prevail through May. Now suppose that on April 16, the
Fed unexpectedly raises the target Fed funds rate to 6%, and that the new rate is expected
to remain in effect through May. Assume the Fed does, in fact, leave the rate at 6%. April’s
average Fed funds rate is 5.5%, reﬂecting 15 days at 5% and 15 days at 6%. The path of
the Fed funds rate and the monthly averages are shown in the top row of ﬁgure 5.
How will the futures rates respond to the surprise? With no change in the Fed funds
rate expected, the futures rates corresponding to the April and May contracts will be 5% up
through April 15. On April 16, the day of the surprise, the futures rate for the May contract
will rise to 6%, reﬂecting the expectation that the 6% rate will prevail throughout May. But
since the April contract is settled against April’s average funds rate, the futures rate for
the April contract will rise to only 5.5%. The paths of the futures rates are depicted in the
left-hand column of the second and third rows of ﬁgure 5.
The Fed’s action on April 16 represents an unexpected increase of 100 basis points
13A similar result is apparent in ﬁgure 7 of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1997).
16Figure 5: Financial markets’ response to a Fed funds surprise
Trading Day Month
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Futures Rate on April Contract
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17Table 5: Funds rate surprises using alternative measures of expectations
Month
March April May
Average Fed funds rate 5.0% 5.5% 6.0%
Futures rate on last day of month 5.0% 6.0% 6.0%
implied Fed funds surprise 0 +50 bp 0
implied expected change 0 +50 bp 0
Average futures rate over month 5.0% 5.5% 6.0%
implied Fed funds surprise 0 +50 bp +50 bp
implied expected change 0 0 0
relative to expectations on April 15 and before. How should the Fed funds surprise be
measured using monthly futures market data? Conceptually, this is simply the realized Fed
funds rate minus its conditional expectation as measured by the futures data. But there are
two complications. First, the futures contract is settled against the monthly average of the
daily Fed funds rate; consequently, the realized Fed funds rate is taken to be the monthly
average of the daily Fed funds rates. The second issue is whether to use point-in-time or
average futures rate data in forming the conditional expectation.
Suppose we use the one-month-ahead futures rate on the last day of the previous month
(e.g., the rate for the April contract as of March 31) as the conditional expectation, and
measure the surprise relative to the monthly average Fed funds rate. In this example, sum-
marized in the top panel of table 5, the April surprise can be computed as April’s average
Fed funds rate (5.5%) minus the March 31 Fed funds futures rate for the April contract
(5%), yielding only a 50 basis point surprise. Again using the futures rate from the last day
of the previous month, the May surprise is calculated as the May average Fed funds rate
(6.0%) minus the April 30 Fed funds futures rate for the May contract (6.0%), yielding no
surprise. Recalling that the average funds rate increases 50 basis points in both April and
May, the ﬁrst 50 basis point increase is taken to be a surprise, while the second 50 basis
points is anticipated. And yet, the example states clearly that the 100 basis point increase
is a complete surprise on April 16. Last-day-of-month futures data, therefore, will tend to
understate the magnitude of the true shock.
An alternative way to measure the Fed funds surprise is to use the monthly average of
a contract’s futures rate, depicted in the right-hand column of the second and third rows of
18ﬁgure 5, for the conditional expectation. This measure of the Fed fund surprise preserves
the size of the shock’s cumulative impact, but spreads it out over two consecutive months.
As summarized in the bottom panel of table 5, the April surprise is computed as the April
average fed funds rate (5.5%) minus the March daily average of the April contract rates
(5.0%), which is a 50 basis point surprise. The May surprise is the May average fed funds
rate (6%) minus the April daily average of the May contract rates (5.5%), yielding a 50
basis point surprise. More generally, the surprise based on average futures rates will be a




























= qut.14 Econometric methods, like those of Hansen and
Hodrick (1980) and Hayashi and Sims (1983), exist to deal with the resulting moving-
average error structure in market efﬁciency tests, but recovering the original “true” shock
from the time-averaged data is generally not possible.
In the examples described so far, the monthly value of the Fed funds rate is taken to
be the monthly average of the daily rates. How would the calculation be affected if the
Fed funds rate from the last day of the month were used in place of the monthly average?
This procedure happens to work for the example described above: the April 30 Fed Funds
rate (6.0%) minus the March 31 Fed funds futures rate for the April contract (5.0%) yields
the correct 100 basis point surprise. This method does not work in all cases, however,
for the simple reason that the settlement price of the futures contract is determined by the
average Fed funds rate. Suppose, for example, that the 100 basis point rate hike on April
15 were anticipated. The March 31 Fed funds futures rate would correctly reﬂect April’s
5.5% average rate, but the difference between the April 30 Fed funds rate and the futures
rate would show a spurious 50 basis point surprise.
One way to reconstruct the “true” April shock is to rescale the ﬁrst measure of the
surprise. Speciﬁcally, compute the surprise as the April average Fed funds rate (5.5%)
minus the March 31 Fed funds futures rate for the April contract (5%), and multiply the
surprise by the factor m
=t, where m is the number of days in the month and t is the number
14Estimating the MA(1) model gives ˆ f
= 0
:38. This implies ˆ q
= 0
:72, which is consistent with surprises
typically occurring on the 8th day of the month.
19Table 6: Volatility of unscaled and rescaled Fed funds futures shocks
Standard deviation
Unscaled Rescaled
Using prior month’s futures rate
Average of effective Fed funds rate 10
:92 8
:2
Average of target Fed funds rate 8
:91 9
:7
Using spot month futures rate ... 22
:9
Notes: The reported statistics are based on the February 1994 through December 1997
period. Units are basis points.
of days affected by the change. In the scenario described above, for instance, the measured
surprise of 50 basis points is scaled up by a factor of two to yield the correct 100 basis
point shock. This procedure only works when the dates of policy changes (and potential
changes) are known, so it would only apply to the post-1994 period in which all changes in
the target Fed funds rate occurred at FOMC meetings.15 Prior to that time, most changes in
the target occurred unpredictably between meetings. In this case, inferring the size of the
“true” shock involves expectations of when the policy action occurs as well as the direction
and magnitude of the change. This is beyond the scope of our analysis.
To get some sense of the quantitative importance of time aggregation, we computed
the standard deviation of the rescaled Fed funds futures surprises for the post-1994 period,
and compared it to the standard deviation of the unscaled shocks for the same period. The
results appear in table 6. As shown on the ﬁrst line of the table, the volatility of the policy
shocks rescaled in this way is dramatically higher — 28.2 basis points compared with 10.9
basis points for the unscaled shocks.
Rescaling the shocks in this way will exaggerate the effects of any transitory deviations
of the funds rate from its target (i.e., “Desk errors”), however, so it will tend to overstate
the volatility of the policy shocks. If there were an FOMC meeting two days before the
end of the month, for example, and if the monthly average Fed funds rate turned out to be
1 basis point above the target, the rescaling will result in a spurious 15 basis point shock.
To reduce the effect of this noise, the average target Fed funds rate can be used in place
of the effective rate. This procedure will distort the size of the shocks only to the extent
15Until the Fed’s 25 basis point rate cut on October 15 1998 (which is not in the sample), the last inter-
meeting change was the 25 basis point increase in April 1994.
20that market participants expect the average effective rate to deviate from the target. Using
the target rate, the standard deviation of the rescaled policy shocks is 19.7 basis points,
compared with only 8.9 for the unscaled shocks.
Another way to gauge the effect of time aggregation on the magnitude of funds rate
surprises is to calculate “one-day-ahead” surprises using the “spot month” contract, which
is based on the average Fed funds rate prevailing in the current month. Suppose, as above,
that changes in the target Fed funds rate only occur immediatelyfollowing an FOMC meet-
ing, and that that the FOMC meeting occurs on April 16. The difference between the April
16 and April 15 futures rates for the April contract would then reﬂect the change in the
expected path of the Fed funds rate over the April 16 to April 30 period. In the scenario
described above, the spot month futures rate on April 15 would have been 5.0%, consistent
with the “no change” expectation. On April 16, after the increase to 6.0%, the spot month
futures rate would be 5.5%, reﬂecting the average Fed funds rate over the entire month of
April; scaling the 50 basis point difference by a factor of two again preserves the size of
the shock. The April 15 futures rate incorporates any information that might have arrived
in the ﬁrst two weeks of the months, however, so surprises computed in this way will tend
to be smaller than those based on the prior month’s futures rate.
The standard deviation of these one-day-ahead Fed funds shocks, reported on the last
line of table 6, is 22.6 basis points — comparable to the rescaled one-month-ahead shocks,
and over twice the size of those without the time-aggregation adjustment. Monetary policy
therefore has a larger random component than a naive examination of futures market data
would suggest.
6 Conclusions
Financial market data, such as Fed funds futures rates, are potentially useful benchmarks
for evaluating econometric measures of systematic and surprise movements in monetary
policy. The approach is not without its pitfalls, however. One hazard involves the interpre-
tation of the correlation between Fed funds futures surprises and VAR shocks. This corre-
lation contains little meaningful information relevant for assessing the VAR’s description
of monetary policy. As shown above, small deviations from the orthogonality condition
implied by market efﬁciency can have a big effect on the correlation.
This is not to say that VARs’ description of monetary policy is perfect. Their fore-
casts are imprecise and noisy, and there is some evidence to suggest parameter instability.
21Shorter lag lengths and a more judicious selection of starting date can mitigate these prob-
lems, however, and the results presented here suggest more research along those lines is
warranted.
One important complication arising in comparisons between VARs and futures-market
forecasts is time aggregation. This problem can distort the timing and magnitude of the
estimated policy surprises: point-in-time futures rate data gets the timing right, but atten-
uates the magnitude, while average data gets the magnitude right but distorts the timing.
This observation has important implications for attempts to draw inferences about the size
of policy shocks from futures market data.
While the distortion created by time aggregation may have signiﬁcant effects on the
contemporaneous correlation between shocks, it is unlikely that it would affect the econ-
omy’s estimated response to those shocks. Because an impulse response function can be
thought of in terms of a regression of the relevant variable on a set of mutually uncorre-
lated shocks, merely shifting the shocks’ dating a month — or even a quarter — in one
direction or another may alter the timing of the response but have little effect on its shape
or size. Consequently, the timing ambiguities identiﬁed above are probably irrelevant for
measuring the real effects of monetary policy.
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